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n the timeless classic, It’s a Wonderful Life, an angel named 
Clarence shows main character George Bailey how the world 
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would have looked without him in it.1  It is the ultimate “what if” 
moment, and George discovers that if he had not been born, the world 
would have been a worse place.  His brother would have died as a 
young boy, soldiers who his brother would have otherwise saved 
would have all passed away, and the town he grew up in would have 
been in ruins.  It is a life-affirming movie, and perhaps that is why 
many of us catch at least a moment of it during December as it loops 
twenty-four hours a day on television.  Wondering what our families’ 
and friends’ lives would be like without us is quite an exercise—one 
that makes us appreciate what we have suffered and enjoyed, how we 
have learned from those moments, and what we have to look forward 
to as life goes on. 
Perhaps because of movies like It’s a Wonderful Life, we think of 
asking this “what if” question as a personal reflective experience.  
But, it need not be limited as such.  The process of considering what 
life might be like without a particular moment or person can have 
broader application.  Just as in the personal sphere, asking this 
question in the academic context forces us to consider what the 
effect—both good and bad—of a particular moment has been, how as 
a society we have benefited or suffered from that moment, and how 
life might have been different without that moment.  Through this 
exercise, an angel may not necessarily earn its wings, but we will gain 
a more concrete understanding of what a particular moment has 
meant. 
It is through a “what if” lens that this Essay tackles the already 
well-discussed cases of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly2 and Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal.3  But, unlike the scholarship that has addressed these cases 
so far, this Essay stakes out a completely different methodological 
approach.4  Rather than predicting what courts might do with 
Twombly and Iqbal going forward, it asks what might have been had 
 
1 IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946). 
2 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
3 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
4 Scholarship to date has been fairly predictive and descriptive, a necessity given how 
recently the cases came down.  There has also been some empirical work about motions to 
dismiss under Twombly and Iqbal, but even those studies are in the very early stages.  See, 
e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 601–02 (2010); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An 
Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 
603 (2012); see also JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011).  Only time will give us a better picture 
of how life will actually change under these cases. 
COLEMAN 3/12/2012  8:01 AM 
2012] What If?: A Study of Seminal Cases as if Decided  1149 
Under a Twombly/Iqbal Regime 
Twombly and Iqbal existed decades ago.  To engage in this exercise, 
this Essay looks at actual complaints in cases that are common fare in 
legal circles and applies the standards enunciated in Twombly and 
Iqbal to them.  By doing so, this Essay attempts to concretely think 
about the consequences of a Twombly/Iqbal pleading regime by 
considering the potential impact that a successful motion to dismiss 
might have had on cases whose existence are taken for granted today. 
Part I of this Essay briefly summarizes the two seminal Supreme 
Court cases that provide the backdrop for this study: Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke5 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.6  
Part II applies Twombly and Iqbal to the original complaints filed in 
Bakke and Price Waterhouse and argues that there is a strong 
likelihood that the Court would have dismissed those complaints 
under a Twombly/Iqbal regime.  Finally, Part III considers what the 
impact would have been if the Court had dismissed those cases.  For 
example, the application of Twombly and Iqbal is likely to impact 
substantive claims historically brought by institutional plaintiffs.  
Even though institutional litigation has become so common over the 
past few decades, the Twombly/Iqbal regime may mark the beginning 
of its demise. 
A consideration of what the law would be like had Twombly and 
Iqbal come earlier requires both micro- and macro-considerations.  At 
the micro-level, it is worth thinking about whether the plaintiffs could 
have refiled the complaints so that they would have ultimately 
survived a motion to dismiss.  At the macro-level, the exercise 
involves a broader consideration of what would have happened had 
the Court never decided the cases.  In other words, how would the 
doctrines defined by that seminal case have been affected?  And, even 
 
5 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
6 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  I reviewed complaints in other seminal cases, including the 
following: Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); 
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 
130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997); J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181 (4th 
Cir. 1985); and Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).  The issues presented in Oncale and Plyler were 
purely legal, and the complaints stated sufficient facts to arguably survive a motion to 
dismiss under Twombly and Iqbal.  The complaint in Jenson contained explicit examples 
of the offending discriminatory statements and actions such that there was only an issue of 
law.  However, the complaints in Adarand, Croson, Hopwood, and Monell were more 
difficult to predict.  Like Bakke and Hopkins, there is a good argument that each of these 
complaints might not have survived a motion to dismiss in a Twombly/Iqbal regime. 
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more broadly, how might the development of particular kinds of law 
practice have changed and how might other modes of social change 
have been utilized?  By considering the effect of Twombly and Iqbal 
in this way, this Essay offers yet another lens through which to 
consider the benefits and drawbacks of a Twombly/Iqbal regime. 
I 
BACKGROUND OF THE SEMINAL CASES 
A.  Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
Allan Bakke applied to the University of California at Davis 
School of Medicine in 1973 and 1974.7  His Medical College 
Aptitude Test scores and his grade point average qualified him for an 
interview with the Davis admissions team both years.8  Yet, he was 
not admitted as a medical student either time.  Given the competitive 
nature of the medical school application process, this was not all that 
surprising.  Of the 2644 applicants in 1973, only 814 made it to the 
interview stage, and of those, Davis admitted only one hundred.9  
Similarly, in 1974, there were 3737 applicants, of which Davis 
interviewed only 462 for the one hundred spots available.10  In 1973, 
the year of his second application, thirty-two nonminority applicants 
who had scores higher than Bakke were also not admitted.11  Of those 
thirty-two, twelve did not make it on the wait list.12  So, Bakke was 
not the only well-qualified candidate that Davis rejected.  Where 
some might see stiff competition, Bakke saw unfairness.  Namely, he 
saw that medical school applicants of color were admitted, while he 
was not. 
Bakke was not imagining that persons of color were gaining entry 
into the medical school to which he aspired.  In 1969, Davis began a 
concerted effort to increase the number of minority students in its 
medical school.  Initially, it set aside a certain number of the one 
hundred available spots in its entering class for applicants who were 
 
7 Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn’t Enough, 32 CONN. 
L. REV. 1, 45 (1999). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Harvey Gee, Book Note, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 277, 285 (2001) (reviewing 
HOWARD BALL, THE BAKKE CASE: RACE, EDUCATION, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
(2000)). 
12 Id. 
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“economically and/or educationally disadvantaged.”13  In 1974, the 
school changed this program to provide spots for minority 
candidates.14  Specifically, it set aside sixteen of its one hundred 
available spots.  The move was an effort to combat institutional 
racism, an effort in which many public colleges and universities were 
engaged. 
When Bakke was rejected in 1974, he did not see the Davis 
admission system as a righting of institutional racism.  To the 
contrary, he saw the admission system itself as racist; he did not gain 
entry into medical school when he otherwise would have because 
less-qualified minority students were given priority admission.  While 
the terminology of “reverse discrimination” had not made its way into 
common parlance quite yet, that is exactly what Bakke perceived.  
And Bakke found a lawyer to make a legal claim that he had suffered 
such discrimination.  In 1974, Bakke filed a complaint in what 
became the landmark case of Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke. 
Bakke filed his case in the Superior Court of the State of 
California, alleging that the Davis admissions policies violated (1) the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, (2) the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
California Constitution, and (3) the Federal Civil Rights Act.  He 
asked the court to require Davis to admit him into its medical school.  
His lawyer was a San Francisco-based practitioner named Reynold 
Colvin.15  Colvin was a well-regarded trial lawyer, and he by all 
accounts handled the case well, but he was not a constitutional 
scholar.16  However, at the beginning of Bakke’s case, it is likely that 
neither Bakke himself nor Colvin knew that the case would ultimately 
become a standard fixture in law school constitutional law courses.  
Bakke and Colvin cared only about getting Bakke into medical 
school. 
At trial, Bakke did not find that success.  While the trial court 
questioned the admissions policy and ultimately held that it was 
unconstitutional, the court did not order Davis to admit Bakke.17  The 
 
13 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274 (1978). 
14 Rush, supra note 7, at 44. 
15 Gee, supra note 11, at 286. 
16 Adolphus Levi Williams, Jr., A Critical Analysis of the Bakke Case, 16 S.U. L. REV. 
129, 143 (1989). 
17 Id. at 154. 
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court did, however, order that Davis consider Bakke for admission 
along with other candidates without regard to his or their race.18  Both 
parties immediately appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of 
California.19  That court affirmed that the Davis admissions policy 
was unconstitutional.20  This led Davis to appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bakke is difficult to decipher 
because it contained so many separate opinions.  The basic holding 
was that quotas are not allowed in admission policies but that the 
consideration of race more generally might be.21  Thus, the Davis 
policy was unconstitutional, but the Court left open the possibility 
that admissions policies could consider race absent such quotas.22  
Finally, and most important to Bakke himself, he was admitted to 
Davis for medical school.23  He is currently a practicing 
anesthesiologist in Minnesota.24 
B.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
Ann Hopkins was by all accounts a success, a woman who had an 
impressive, loving husband, three kids, and an enviable career at a 
major accounting firm.  Her world came crashing down, however, 
when her firm denied her a partnership, her husband divorced her, and 
she lost one of her children in a drunk-driving accident.25  Hopkins 
survived all of these moments and is still with us today.  Most notably 
for purposes of this Essay, she also became the subject of one of the 
most defining Title VII cases involving gender discrimination in the 
employment context.26 
 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 162. 
20 Id. at 165–66. 
21 Id. at 208–09. 
22 See id. at 209. 
23 Id. at 220. 
24 See Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 GEO. 
L.J. 981, 981 (1999). 
25 Ann Hopkins, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Personal Account of a Sexual 
Discrimination Plaintiff, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357, 360–61, 414 (2005). 
26 Cheryl A. Pilate, Comment, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A Mixed Outcome for 
Title VII Mixed-Motive Plaintiffs, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 107, 108 (1989) (“Amid the rapid 
razing of established civil rights law, one case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, emerged as a 
lone victory.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Hopkins was a successful career woman.  She worked at IBM 
before joining Touche Ross & Co., which was then one of the “Big 
Eight” national accounting firms.27  She met her husband at Touche, 
and when they married, she agreed to leave the firm to avoid any 
issues with the firm’s nepotism policy.28  She joined a Touche 
competitor, Price Waterhouse, as a consultant.29  In the meantime, her 
husband became a partner at Touche.30  Hopkins worked in the Office 
of Government Services at Price Waterhouse.31  She immediately set 
herself apart by being a key player in securing what was then the 
largest consulting project the firm had ever undertaken.32  After five 
successful years at Price Waterhouse, Hopkins went up for partner.33  
She did not succeed.34  At first, she was told that the firm would hold 
her partnership over for another year, but that next year, she was told 
that she would never make partner.35  This rejection occurred in spite 
of deep support from the partners who had worked with Hopkins 
because the other partners strongly disapproved of her.36  Their 
rejection of her partnership application was accompanied by 
comments like the following: she “overcompensated for being a 
woman,” was “macho,” and needed “a course at charm school.”37  
The partners also noted that she was “[o]verly aggressive, unduly 
harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff” and that she 
was “[u]niversally disliked.”38  When she was told she was going to 
be held over, her strongest supporter advised that she “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”39 
 
27 Hopkins, supra note 25, at 358. 
28 Id. at 359. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 360. 
33 Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Noncomformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 211 (2007). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 211–12. 
36 Id. at 211. 
37 Id. 
38 Hopkins, supra note 25, at 361. 
39 Friedman, supra note 33, at 212. 
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Hopkins sued.  She alleged that Price Waterhouse excluded her 
from partnership “because of her sex” and that such treatment led to 
her constructive discharge in violation of Title VII.40  In federal court, 
the district judge presiding over Hopkins’s case determined that 
gender stereotyping had contributed to the denial of Hopkins’s bid for 
partnership; however, the judge also found that the firm had 
legitimate reasons for the denial.41  Ultimately, the judge determined 
that reliance on even some of the partners’ sexist comments was 
enough to show Price Waterhouse’s liability under Title VII.42  The 
problem for Hopkins was that the district court judge rejected her 
argument that she had been constructively discharged, so she did not 
receive back pay, nor was she rehired.43  Instead, the judge ordered 
Price Waterhouse only to pay attorneys’ fees.44  Both parties 
appealed.45 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed 
with the liability result.  The D.C. Circuit took issue with how the 
district court had handled the burdens of proof, however.46  The 
appellate court argued that if the defendant employer were able to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the 
same employment decision even without the discriminatory 
considerations, then that would be a complete defense to liability.47  
(The trial court had held that such a defense would act only as a 
limitation on the remedy a plaintiff could recover, not a complete 
defense.)  Ultimately, this did not matter because the appellate court 
determined that regardless of whether the “same decision” defense 
was complete or not, Price Waterhouse had not met its burden in 
showing this defense.48  Price Waterhouse appealed. 
At the Supreme Court, the only issue for review was how the 
burden of proof would be allocated in what became known as 
“mixed-motive” employment discrimination cases.49  Such cases 
 
40 Infra Appendix B, p. 1177.  Hopkins also alleged violations of the District of 
Columbia Human Rights Act.  Infra Appendix B, p. 1178. 
41 Friedman, supra note 33, at 212. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 213. 
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involved a potentially legitimate reason for the adverse employment 
decision, as well as a discriminatory one.50  The Supreme Court did 
not reach a definitive conclusion, but the Court did resolve some 
issues.  Essentially, the Court determined that in mixed-motive cases, 
the plaintiff had to show that sex played a role in the adverse 
employment decision.51  Once the plaintiff made that showing, the 
burden shifted to the defendant to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have reached the same decision even without 
that discriminatory consideration.52  The most lasting effect of this 
case, however, was that the Court explicitly recognized that gender 
stereotyping could evidence discrimination.53 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, Hopkins’s case was 
remanded back down to the district court.54  Hopkins won.  Price 
Waterhouse rehired her as a partner and paid all of her back pay and 
attorneys’ fees.55  She remained a partner for seven years, then took a 
different position in the firm, only to retire about four years later.56  
She now writes and speaks around the world about her case.57 
The case itself now has only limited precedential value.58  In 1991, 
Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which clarified the 
plaintiff’s burden in mixed-motive cases59 and reversed the Court’s 
treatment of the employer’s same decision defense.60  Nonetheless, 
the case still stands as precedent for the notion that “nonconformity to 
 
50 Pilate, supra note 26, at 114. 
51 The plurality would have required that the plaintiff show that the prohibited 
consideration of sex was a “motivating” factor in the employment decision while two 
concurring Justices would have required a showing that the prohibited consideration of sex 
was a “substantial factor” in the employment decision.  Id. at 114–15. 
52 Id. at 114. 
53 Hopkins, supra note 25, at 364. 
54 Id. at 364–65. 
55 Id. at 365. 
56 See id. at 410–11. 
57 Id. at 414. 
58 Friedman, supra note 33, at 214.  “[T]he case’s precedential value appears to have 
evaporated.”  Id. 
59 Congress adopted the plurality’s test requiring “that the plaintiff need only establish 
that sex or some other forbidden factor was a motivating factor for the employer’s 
challenged action.”  Id. at 213–14. 
60 The defense is still shown by a preponderance of the evidence standard, but it does 
not operate as a complete defense.  Id. at 213. 
COLEMAN 3/12/2012  8:01 AM 
1156 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 1147 
gendered expectations can constitute a form of statutorily proscribed 
sex-based discrimination.”61 
II 
THE ARGUMENT: BAKKE AND PRICE WATERHOUSE MIGHT NOT HAVE 
SURVIVED UNDER TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
Pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been in a 
fairly steady state for over fifty years when the Supreme Court 
decided the case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.62  On its face, the 
case did not portend that it would reset procedural doctrine regarding 
pleading: it was an antitrust case brought by plaintiffs who believed 
that the “Baby Bells,” who in spite of being broken into separate 
regional companies, conspired with one another to keep out 
competitors.63  The Court determined that the case should have been 
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).64  Under 
antitrust law, the plaintiffs would ultimately have to prove more than 
mere parallel behavior.65  They would have to show that the parties 
actively colluded, and because the allegations in the complaint did not 
allege more than the conclusory allegation of “unlawful conduct,” the 
complaint could not survive.66  The Court refused to infer from the 
facts pled—simple parallel behavior—the possibility of an antitrust 
violation.67  It raised the consequences of wasteful litigation and “in 
terrorem” discovery to argue that complaints, while still governed by 
Rule 8, required more than just conclusory allegations to move 
forward in litigation.68  Most importantly, the Court “retired” the oft-
relied-on “no set of facts” language from Conley v. Gibson.69 
Less than two years after Twombly was decided, the Court came 
down with another pleading opinion, Ashcroft v. Iqbal.70  In that case, 
 
61 Id. at 219. 
62 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  The Court had in fact reaffirmed the basic tenets of notice 
pleading in two modern cases, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002), 
and Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 
U.S. 163 (1993). 
63 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550–51. 
64 See id. at 554. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 556. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 557–58. 
69 Id. at 561–63 (discussing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 
70 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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the Court reaffirmed Twombly.71  It found that Iqbal’s allegations of 
discrimination by government officials like John Ashcroft and Robert 
Mueller were not plausible based on what was pled in Iqbal’s 
complaint.72  According to the Court, rather than actively 
discriminating against individuals of Arab and/or Muslim descent in 
the aftermath of 9/11, it was more plausible that these government 
officials were acting in good faith in their law enforcement capacity.73  
The Court also clarified the test for reviewing complaints.  First, a 
court must strike all conclusory allegations that are not supported by 
well-pleaded facts; a court does not have to accept the allegations as 
true.74  Second, a court must review what remains of the complaint in 
order to determine whether the well-pleaded facts state a plausible 
claim for relief.75  Notably, plausibility is determined on the basis of a 
judge’s “judicial experience and common sense.”76 
Following these two decisions, there has been continued and 
spirited debate about how the cases will be used by courts.  There is 
substantial discretion built into the standard—“judicial experience 
and common sense” is an invitation to use one’s own judgment about 
the plausibility of a claim.  Thus, it is no surprise that district and 
appellate court decisions to date are all over the map.77  In other 
words, across the judiciary, judges are reading and applying Twombly 
and Iqbal differently.  It is with this discretion and variance in mind 
 
71 Id. at 1949. 
72 Id. at 1951. 
73 Id. at 1951–52. 
74 Id. at 1949–51. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1950. 
77 See, e.g., Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (interpreting 
the plausibility standard to mean that a “court will ask itself could these things have 
happened, not did they happen”); Ruston v. Town Bd. of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d 
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 824 (2010) (holding that plaintiffs bringing an equal 
protection claim failed to allege facts that “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief” 
because they did not allege “specific examples” of superior treatment to those “similarly 
situated” with respect to housing development applications); Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & 
Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that “[e]xactly how implausible 
is ‘implausible’ remains to be seen, as such a malleable standard will have to be worked 
out in practice”); Mehrhoff v. William Floyd Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 04-CV-
3850(JS)(MLO), 2009 WL 5219019, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2009) (finding a “plausible 
Section 1983 discrimination claim, although . . . ‘actual proof of those facts is improbable, 
and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely,’” when a plaintiff alleged that the defendants 
intentionally wrote false negative performance reviews and threatened to reveal her sexual 
orientation). 
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that this Essay analyzes the complaints in Bakke and Price 
Waterhouse. 
A.  Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
The complaint in Bakke is all of four pages in length.  It contains 
only four paragraphs of factual allegations.  His sparse complaint 
stated that he had not been admitted to medical school because other 
applicants had been admitted under “separate segregated admission 
procedures” that used “separate standards.”78  He even had some facts 
to back up these statements—an account that sixteen of the one 
hundred applicants admitted were from this “separate” pool.79  Yet, 
Bakke’s claim of discrimination would ultimately require him to 
prove that he was an otherwise-qualified applicant for admission to 
medical school.  On that count, Bakke’s complaint stated an arguably 
conclusory allegation—he claimed that he was a “qualified” applicant 
without providing facts to make that a plausible claim.80  In other 
words, he did not state his scores, nor did he articulate where he 
ranked in the admissions pool. 
This statement that Bakke was a qualified applicant is similar to the 
allegation made in Twombly.  In that case, the Court held that merely 
alleging parallel conduct, without more, was not enough.  The 
plaintiff had to plead facts showing that there was collusion or an 
agreement to conspire.81  The Court determined that the plaintiffs 
would ultimately have to prove the collusion, so in order to survive a 
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs similarly had to allege something more 
than just a conclusory allegation of collusion.82  They had to give 
some facts.83 
Like the plaintiffs in Twombly, Bakke also failed to provide any 
facts to back up his conclusory allegation that he was a “qualified” 
applicant.  Given this unsupported conclusory allegation, if a court 
today were reviewing this complaint, it might very well dismiss the 
case.  A court may have determined that Bakke had not stated a 
plausible claim because he had nothing but a bare allegation of his 
qualifications as a medical school candidate.  Thus, regardless of 
 
78 Infra Appendix A, p. 1172. 
79 Infra Appendix A, p. 1172. 
80 Infra Appendix A, p. 1172. 
81 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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whether there was a separate race-based admission standard, Bakke 
himself had not suffered discrimination.  Without any facts, a court 
might have determined that a more plausible story was that he simply 
did not qualify under the medical school’s standards for admission.  
He might not have been admitted because he was just not good 
enough. 
This, in fact, looks to be the case with Bakke.  Almost fifty medical 
candidates with scores superior to Bakke were also denied admission, 
meaning that even if the sixteen spots had not been set aside for 
minority candidates, he still might not have been admitted.84  In 
addition, some white students who had scores lower than Bakke had 
been admitted through the standard admissions process, so even 
assuming he was qualified, he was not necessarily pushed out by the 
minority applicants.85  Thus, based on a judge’s judicial experience 
and common sense, she might have determined that without any facts 
to show that Bakke might have otherwise been admitted, she could 
infer only that he was not admitted because he was not qualified.  The 
conclusory statement that he was in fact qualified would not have to 
be accepted as true. 
One notable wrinkle in this argument is that, in the actual case, 
Davis stipulated that Bakke would have been admitted were it not for 
its special admissions policy.86  Davis apparently conceded this point 
so that it could quickly reach the merits of whether its admissions 
policy would survive constitutional scrutiny.87  This is why the case 
never went to trial, but was instead decided by a judge based on 
stipulated facts.88  So, it could be that even if Twombly and Iqbal 
were in effect in 1974, Davis would still not have moved to dismiss.  
If the purpose of the case was to resolve the constitutionality of its 
admissions policy, then perhaps Davis would not have bothered with 
such a motion.  However, under Conley, there is no doubt that 
Bakke’s complaint would have survived scrutiny, so if Davis wanted 
to challenge Bakke’s qualifications for admission, that challenge 
would have come up much later, either on a motion for summary 
judgment or at trial.  It is hard to know for sure, but Davis might have 
 
84 See Selmi, supra note 24, at 986. 
85 See id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
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resisted pursuing the issue of Bakke’s qualifications because of the 
cost associated with discovery and a summary judgment motion 
and/or trial.  Davis’s calculus might have been quite different if it 
could have successfully resolved the case much earlier on a motion to 
dismiss.  Of course, if Davis were so set on testing the 
constitutionality of its admissions policy, it might still have stipulated 
that Bakke was qualified.  There is an argument, however, that Davis 
might have moved to dismiss this case and “tested” its policy with a 
different plaintiff and a different set of facts. 
Another wrinkle is that even if the complaint had been dismissed, 
Bakke may have been able to cure the complaint by amending it to 
add well-pleaded facts.  After all, he knew what his test scores and 
past grade point averages were and presumably he could have 
included those qualifications in the complaint.  Yet, it is unlikely that 
he knew his relative place in the applicant pool.  He would have 
needed that information to ultimately prove that, were it not for the 
special admissions program, he would have been admitted.  Davis 
held that information, and the easiest way for Bakke to obtain it was 
by filing his complaint and proceeding with discovery.  If a judge 
used Twombly and Iqbal to argue that Bakke did not plead enough 
facts for her to plausibly infer that, without regard to race, Bakke was 
qualified to gain entry into Davis Medical School’s one hundred 
spots, his complaint would have been dismissed.  And, without the 
additional information that he would have found if he were allowed to 
conduct discovery, it is not clear that he could have cured his 
complaint.  He would have needed discovery or access to information 
through other channels.  He might have found that information 
through a friendly source on the admissions committee, but it is 
unlikely.  Thus, there is a good argument that if his complaint were 
dismissed on these grounds, he would not have been able to cure it. 
B.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
When Hopkins filed her complaint, she had limited information.  
She believed that she had not been made a partner at Price 
Waterhouse because of gender stereotypes, but she had little evidence 
that this was the case.  Her complaint demonstrates as much.  She set 
the groundwork by detailing her accomplishments at Price 
Waterhouse and by noting that only five of the firm’s six hundred 
partners were women.89  But, when it came to noting why she thought 
 
89 Infra Appendix B, pp. 1175–76. 
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she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex, the only fact 
she had was that an employee at Price Waterhouse had told her to 
“‘soften’ her image” by “wear[ing] make-up and styl[ing] her hair.”90  
In order to ultimately prove her case, she would have to show that 
improper gender stereotypes played some role in the decision not to 
elevate her to partner.  The only fact she pleaded regarding a gender 
stereotype was the comment about softening her image. 
Because Price Waterhouse was a discrimination case, it is most 
analogous to Iqbal.  In that case, Iqbal alleged that he had been 
detained and treated poorly because of his national origin.91  The 
majority in Iqbal rejected Iqbal’s argument that Ashcroft and Mueller 
had discriminated against Iqbal because he failed to allege facts 
making it plausible that such discrimination occurred.92  Instead, the 
Court determined that the plausible (and legal) reason that Iqbal was 
arrested was because of a legitimate law enforcement response to a 
threat of terrorist attacks.93  The fact that Iqbal had pleaded that a 
large proportion of the men arrested in this sweep were of Arab 
and/or Muslim descent, and that Iqbal was subject to torture and 
conduct that indicated discrimination against Arab and Muslim 
individuals, was not enough for the majority of the Court.94  In the 
same way, a judge using Twombly and Iqbal to evaluate Hopkins’s 
complaint could have determined that the lack of facts pleaded 
regarding gender stereotypes meant that the more plausible reason for 
the denial of her partnership was merit based.  One comment about 
softening her image did not necessarily mean that she was denied 
promotion because of gender stereotypes.  In other words, a judge 
using her common sense and judicial experience might have 
determined that there were not enough well-pleaded facts to 
demonstrate the plausibility of Hopkins’s claim.  Of course, a judge 
might have inferred that the comment regarding Hopkins’s image, 
when juxtaposed with her excellent qualifications, meant that she 
might have been denied partnership because of gender stereotypes.  
But, because the facts pleaded regarding gender stereotypes were thin, 
if not nonexistent, a judge could have refused to make this inference, 
 
90 Infra Appendix B, p. 1177. 
91 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009). 
92 Id. at 1952. 
93 Id. at 1951–53. 
94 Id. 
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instead opting for the more plausible inference that the promotion 
decision was legitimate. 
This means that the issue of her qualifications for partnership 
would have been important.  If she was so obviously qualified for 
partnership, then a judge might have determined that there was no 
legitimate reason for denying her promotion.  Here, like Bakke’s 
complaint, Hopkins alleged that she was “qualified” for partnership.95  
In fact, she took it one step further and alleged that she might have 
even been “more qualified” than some of the men who were promoted 
to partnership the same year that she was up.96  Unlike Bakke, 
Hopkins did not rest on conclusory statements of her qualifications 
vis-à-vis other partnership candidates.  The problem is that the facts 
she pleaded did not necessarily demonstrate anything definitive about 
her qualifications.  She noted that “of the three men . . . who became 
partners in [Hopkins’s] office [the year she applied], one had worked 
for [Price Waterhouse] for less time than [Hopkins] had, while 
another had served as [Hopkins’s] subordinate.”97  These facts are 
interesting, but they did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
Hopkins was as or more qualified than the men who obtained 
partnership.  Similarly, the sections of the complaint that directly 
quoted positive reviews of her work did not help.  Two of the quotes 
are from partners who knew her and were on record as being 
supportive of her work.98  The other quote is from a client, but it did 
not speak of Hopkins directly.99  It lauded “all members of the project 
team.”100  Taking all of these facts as true, as a judge still must do 
even under Twombly and Iqbal, would not do any work for Hopkins.  
The facts do not lead to the conclusion that she was denied 
partnership because of gender stereotypes.  They simply show that 
some partners thought she was qualified for partnership, while others 
did not.101  Again, a judge using her judicial experience and common 
 
95 Infra Appendix B, p. 1177. 
96 Infra Appendix B, p. 1177. 
97 Infra Appendix B, p. 1177. 
98 See infra Appendix B, p. 1176. 
99 See infra Appendix B, p. 1176. 
100 Infra Appendix B, p. 1176. 
101 In the partnership process at Price Waterhouse, there was no real formula.  A 
candidate with a number of positive comments would not necessarily be granted a 
partnership and a person who had a number of negative comments was not necessarily 
defeated.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 232–33 (1989). There were also no 
limits placed on the number of employees who could become partners.  Id. at 233.  The 
number varied year to year. 
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sense would know that in hiring and promotion decisions, people 
disagree about the merits of a candidate.  Disagreement about the 
merits is not necessarily motivated by discriminatory intent, and 
without more facts showing such intent, a judge could conclude that 
the plausible reason for Hopkins’s failed attempt for partnership was 
based only on merit. 
As with Bakke’s case, there is a question as to whether Hopkins 
might have been able to cure her complaint by amending it to add 
more facts.  Those facts were out there—the comments about her 
being “macho” and needing a course in “charm school” were certainly 
probative of gender stereotypes.  The question is whether she had 
access to those comments prior to filing her complaint.  In Hopkins’s 
own personal account, she wrote that many of these comments were 
read to her by a senior partner.102  It is unclear from her account, 
however, whether she had physical custody of the partner reviews.  It 
is also unclear from her personal account whether she remembered 
those statements from her meeting with her senior partner or whether 
she had remembered them from the entirety of the litigation process.  
Her lawyer certainly did not include any of those statements in the 
complaint, so it is likely that she did not remember the statements and 
even more likely that she did not have physical copies of them.  
Instead, she probably got the evaluations and statements through 
discovery.  Thus, had her complaint not survived a motion to dismiss, 
she never would have gained access to this information.  Again, like 
Bakke’s complaint, if the court had granted a motion to dismiss in 
Hopkins’s case, it is unlikely that she could have amended her 
complaint to add the well-pleaded facts necessary to successfully state 
a claim under Twombly and Iqbal. 
III 
WHAT IF? 
Like George Bailey, this Essay has been thrust into the “what if” 
scenario.  Under Twombly and Iqbal, it is very possible that Bakke, 
Price Waterhouse, and other similarly seminal cases might not have 
survived a motion to dismiss.  The next question is how would life be 
different if these kinds of cases were unsuccessful? 
 
102 Hopkins, supra note 25, at 361. 
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A.  Elimination of Institutional Plaintiffs and Defendants? 
Litigation has become a tool for initiating and implementing social 
change.  Because of the power of litigation, there are a number of 
interest groups, nonprofits, think tanks, and other organizations that 
have a vested interest in certain litigation matters.  These interests 
have led to an institutionalization of litigants.  In other words, there is 
a business aspect to all litigation, even litigation about social change.  
Organizations supporting such litigation often handpick the proper 
plaintiff or plaintiffs.  For example, in the litigation challenging 
California’s referendum banning gay marriage, the plaintiffs were 
carefully chosen.103  They were two upstanding, white, gay couples, 
who would not distract from the substantive issues in the case, and if 
anything, would just help the cause.  As one commentator described, 
“It isn’t easy to find the right plaintiffs for a high-profile 
constitutional case.  There have been plaintiffs before the Supreme 
Court who made moving and stalwart examples of the principle they 
were upholding, and plaintiffs who faltered on the job.”104 
The use of litigation to promote social change grew from the 
increasing success of such litigation from the mid-1950s and 
beyond.105  Once it was clear that courts were a viable vehicle for 
such change, when legislation or some other mode of change might 
not have been, planning and, more importantly, money started to 
funnel toward litigation and litigation strategy.  However, what if 
litigation like Bakke’s had not been successful?  What if Bakke’s 
complaint had been dismissed and he had not been able to amend it?  
If that kind of litigation had not worked, perhaps groups like the 
ACLU or the Manhattan Institute would not be as powerful as they 
are today.  And, even if those types of groups were relatively as 
prominent, they might not have been so in the litigation context. 
Bakke presents an interesting case because it was solely defended 
by the lawyers hired by the public institution defendant, the 
 
103 See Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010, at 40. 
104 Id. at 44.  Finding plaintiffs is a difficult task.  For example, one of the most well-
known and controversial plaintiffs is Norma McCorvey, the plaintiff in the landmark case 
of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  McCorvey has since come out in opposition to 
legalized abortions and has most recently made a cameo appearance in film about 
abortion.  See Paul Bond, Roe v. Wade Plaintiff Stars in Abortion-Themed Film, REUTERS, 
May 6, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/06/us-janeroe-idUSTRE7450D020 
110506.  Depending on one’s ideological stance, McCorvey is now lionized or demonized. 
105 Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and 
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 444–46 (2001). 
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University of California at Davis.  Interest groups like the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund filed amici briefs, but the groups 
were not directly involved in the litigation in any meaningful way.106  
Thus, with Bakke on one side and the Davis Medical School on the 
other, the litigation was notably lacking in anyone to represent the 
real issue in the case, namely the interests of minorities who might 
benefit from Davis’s (and other similar) admissions policies.  Because 
of this lack of representation and because of some questionable moves 
by Davis,107 Davis’s integrity in the litigation was challenged.108  
Detractors argued that Davis did not pursue the case as well as others 
could, that Davis hoped it would lose, and that while Davis hired 
generalized constitutional experts, Davis did not hire those who 
specialized in civil rights litigation.109  The “loss” of Bakke arguably 
motivated liberal interest groups to more carefully craft their litigation 
and select their representative plaintiffs.  In other words, had interest 
groups been more involved in Bakke as the case developed, the 
groups might not have stipulated as to Bakke’s qualifications, waiting 
instead for a more “winnable” case against a different plaintiff. 
A similar controversy has brewed over the gay marriage ban in 
California.  Interest groups have heavily debated what the strategy for 
litigation should be, and many pro-gay-marriage groups have argued 
that challenging the California referendum all the way to the Supreme 
Court at this point in time is a grave mistake.110  The difference 
between the California case and Bakke, however, is that the lawyers 
in the California case have actively listened to these groups.  The 
lawyers and interest groups have largely agreed to disagree, but the 
strategy meetings and debates have taken place.111  That was not the 
case with Bakke, and it is worth thinking about how the success of 
cases like Bakke and others have led to this “institutionalization” of 
litigation.  Further, it is worth thinking about whether the way 
litigation is controlled by particular groups with broad agenda 
 
106 See Selmi, supra note 24, at 988–91; Williams, supra note 16, at 181–82. 
107 For example, Davis never brought up the involvement of one of its employees, Peter 
Storandt.  Storandt was an administrator in the medical school who all but encouraged 
Bakke to file his case.  Williams, supra note 16, at 139.  Some have alleged that this was 
an improper action for an agent of the medical school to take.  Id. at 140–41. 
108 Id. at 182–84. 
109 Id. 
110 See, e.g., Chuleenan Svetvilas, Challenging Prop. 8: The Hidden Story, CAL. LAW., 
Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=906575&evid=1. 
111 Id. 
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motives is a good thing.  And, finally, if cases like Bakke had not 
been successful and thus had not led to the creation of these litigation 
interests, how would those now-established litigation interests be 
affected?  Will current Bakke-like cases be able to survive a motion to 
dismiss?  And, if not, what will happen to the institutions that have 
become so powerful in the litigation context?  Perhaps the 
institutionalization of litigation is so entrenched that it will survive the 
change to pleading standards.  But, perhaps it will not. 
B.  Substantive Differences in Development of the Law? 
One undeniable effect of the loss of cases like Bakke and Price 
Waterhouse is that the legal change they affected would have been 
lost.  The question is whether another case would have filled that 
void, or whether the law would have developed on a completely 
different trajectory. 
It is possible that had Bakke not been successful another white 
candidate for a spot in a graduate or post-graduate institution would 
have reached the same result through litigation.  The real question is 
whether any such plaintiff would have had access to the information 
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss.  It is possible that a plaintiff 
could have accessed that information by requesting the records 
directly from the institution, by hiring a private investigator, or by 
getting them from a disgruntled employee.  But, the prospect of losing 
the motion or spending the time and money to get the information 
through other means might have actually chilled all litigation in this 
context. 
So, how else might the Bakkes of the world have found relief?  
They might have been able to garner enough political strength to 
initiate legislative change.  It is difficult to say whether they would 
have been successful and what such success might have looked like.  
Given that affirmative action is still a controversial and seemingly 
insurmountable issue, it seems unlikely that they could have obtained 
satisfactory relief.  And, even if they could, it is similarly difficult to 
know what that relief would look like.  Because a case like Bakke led 
to additional Supreme Court cases like Grutter v. Bollinger and 
others, Congress has seemed to stay out of the fray.112  It might have 
 
112 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that a law school admissions 
program that gave special consideration for being a certain racial minority did not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Selmi, supra note 24, at 1019–20 (noting that 
despite an increasing hostility to affirmative action in recent years, “legislatures—
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been different if the Court was unable to take on a case like Bakke or 
Grutter.  In that situation, Congress may have been able to do 
something completely different, perhaps better clarifying how race 
could factor into admissions policies or perhaps muddying the waters 
even more. 
C.  Role of Lawyers as Elements of Social Change? 
It is common to think of lawyers as an integral element of social 
change—on the bench, in the courtroom, as lobbyists, and as 
legislators, lawyers move social policy.113  Lawyers have used the 
civil justice system as a major mode of social change.114  But, what if 
that mode was closed off because cases, at least many in the civil 
rights context, might not have survived a motion to dismiss?  Lawyers 
work for social change beyond the courtroom, of course, but if this 
mode of change were closed to certain kinds of cases, how would 
lawyering be different? 
As discussed earlier, institutions like the ACLU or the Manhattan 
Institute might not have developed such a presence in litigation.  
Lawyers are a part of these institutions, but if litigation were not a 
mode of social change, perhaps these institutions would be heavily 
populated by policymakers, not by lawyers.  And perhaps many of 
those in the profession who chose that career path because of their 
potential role in moving social policy would have made different 
choices.  It is difficult to say how the profession would have been 
affected.  But in the very least, if litigation like Bakke’s and 
Hopkins’s had not been successful, lawyers might not have been 
viewed as professionals who could change social dynamics in our 
society.  Thus, the profession might have had a very different self-
identity without the ability to successfully pursue cases like Bakke 
and Price Waterhouse.  Moreover, if similar cases are closed off 
today under a Twombly/Iqbal regime, the legal profession and its 
identity might transform into one that no longer values its impact on 
social change. 
 
particularly Congress—have expressed surprisingly little interest in revisiting or revising 
affirmative action programs”). 
113 Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation 
Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 2000–01 (2004). 
114 Cummings & Eagly, supra note 105, at 444–50. 
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D.  Access to Justice? 
If lawyers no longer facilitated social change, how might 
marginalized individuals have been affected?  Many of the cases that 
were successful in a pre-Twombly/Iqbal regime were brought by 
individuals seeking relief against strong adversaries and with all the 
odds against them.  Ideologically, one might agree or disagree with 
the positions taken in Bakke and Price Waterhouse, but because of a 
generous pleading standard, the plaintiffs were able to seek and find 
relief for their alleged grievances.  Their success largely hinged on 
their ability to find lawyers to take their cases—lawyers who must 
have believed that the complaints they would draft would survive 
motions to dismiss.  As already discussed, the regime is now one in 
which certain kinds of claims are significantly less likely to survive to 
a motion to dismiss.  This means that similar claims today brought by 
similarly marginalized people are less likely to succeed and that 
lawyers today will be less likely to take a chance on such claims. 
This is not meant to argue that access to justice is cut off simply 
because of Twombly and Iqbal.  It is far more complicated than that—
legal aid is dwindling, corporate power is growing, and a plethora of 
other factors contribute to this phenomenon.  However, the pleading 
regime under Twombly and Iqbal has certainly contributed to the 
decline in access to justice.  It is anecdotal at best, but as this Essay 
discusses, individuals who sought access to justice against many odds 
succeeded under a more generous regime.  Today, those individuals 
would be unlikely to bring their claims and even less likely to find a 
lawyer to help them do so. 
E.  More Nuanced Development of the Law? 
The effect of the institutionalization of litigation is that the law 
tends to develop in a forced fashion.  In other words, there are not as 
many organic moments because institutionalized plaintiffs and 
defendants control the mainstays of litigation.  Continuing on with the 
“what if” question, if cases like Bakke and Price Waterhouse would 
have failed, meaning institutionalized litigation would not have the 
force it does today, does that mean that all civil rights litigation would 
have ceased?  Or, does it mean that the litigation would have 
developed more organically?  Instead of one chosen case making its 
way to the Supreme Court, perhaps a number of different cases with 
nuanced facts would have percolated at the district court and appellate 
court level.  The Supreme Court might have stepped in only once a 
COLEMAN 3/12/2012  8:01 AM 
2012] What If?: A Study of Seminal Cases as if Decided  1169 
Under a Twombly/Iqbal Regime 
divide arose in the development of those cases.  In other words, 
perhaps the development of the law might have been less orchestrated 
by institutional players. 
A related effect of an organic development of the law might be 
greater societal trust in the institutions that produce that law.  If a 
number of individuals are seeking and finding relief in the courts and 
nuanced legal doctrine flows from their cases, then individuals 
looking in on that litigation might have greater faith in the courts.  
People who look like them are seeking and finding relief; it is not a 
“representative” moment when a person who has nothing in common 
with them is chosen by an institution to represent a cause. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how individuals could have 
succeeded in much of the seminal litigation over the last fifty years, 
even in a pre-Twombly/Iqbal regime.  The resource disparities were, 
and still are, quite vast between an individual plaintiff and an 
organizational defendant.  Moreover, many of these individuals are 
already marginalized and lack access to other modes of remedy like 
legislative change through Congress.  Thus, the loss of cases like 
Bakke and Price Waterhouse might have instead meant the further 
marginalization of similarly situated people.  In the current context of 
Twombly and Iqbal, it is even more difficult to see how an individual 
plaintiff would be able to surmount these challenges.  So, while the 
use of those cases in the past might have prevented the development 
of institutionalized litigation, Twombly and Iqbal would have 
prevented success by individual plaintiffs as well.  Time will tell what 
the impact of these cases will be on these types of plaintiffs going 
forward.115 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay is only the beginning of a longer and larger 
conversation about how cases like Twombly and Iqbal have changed 
the legal landscape.  It is hardly an exhaustive treatment of the “what 
if” question, but it provides a place to start.  In thinking about other 
seminal cases that are taken for granted, it is worth thinking further 
about whether those cases would survive if they were brought today.  
With respect to the group of cases that this Essay has collected, the 
answer is generally no.  Cases that have defined rights for 
 
115 See Brooke Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1908359. 
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individuals—rights that many still hold dear, whether they consider 
themselves ideologically conservative or liberal—would likely not 
have been decided on the merits under a Twombly/Iqbal regime.  The 
deeper and more disturbing question to ask now is, what cases and 
rights are going to be sacrificed in the future?  This isn’t It’s a 
Wonderful Life, so Clarence cannot provide the answer.  And, because 
the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard is likely to defeat filed cases, or 
chill their filings from the outset, the answer might be unknowable. 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YOLO 
 
ALLAN BAKKE,  ) 
    ) 
Petitioner and   ) 
Plaintiff   ) 
    ) 
vs    )  No. 31287 
    ) 
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY) COMPLAINT 
OF CALIFORNIA  ) FOR 
   ) MANDATORY 
Defendants and  ) INJUNCTIVE, 
Respondents  ) AND 
   ) DECLARATORY 
   ) RELIEF 
_________________________________  ) 
 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Petitioner and plaintiff ALLAN BAKKE (hereinafter called 
plaintiff) alleges for a first cause of action: 
I. 
That plaintiff is a citizen of the State of California and of the 
United States of America. 
II. 
That defendants and respondents The Regents of the University of 
California (hereinafter called defendants) are public officers of the 
State of California, maintaining, operating and administrating the 
School of Medicine, University of California, Davis, Yolo County, 
California (hereinafter called said Medical School); that said Medical 
School is supported by public funds and tax monies and receives 
federal financial assistance. 
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III. 
That plaintiff duly and timely filed his applications with said 
Medical School for admission to the first-year classes of said Medical 
School commencing in September 1973, and September 1974; that in 
each year, respectively, plaintiff received notification from said 
Medical School that his applications were denied. 
IV. 
That plaintiff was and is in all respects duly qualified for admission 
to said Medical School and the sole reason his applications were 
rejected was on account of his race, to-wit, Caucasian or white, and 
not for reasons applicable to persons of every race, as follows: 
That a special admissions committee composed of racial minority 
members evaluated applications of special group of persons pur-
portedly from economic and educationally disadvantaged 
backgrounds; that from this group a quota of 16%, or 16 out of 100 
first-year class members, was selected; that in fact, all applicants 
admitted to said Medical School as members of this group were 
members of racial minorities; that under this admission program 
racial minority and majority applicants went through separate 
segregated admission procedures with separate standards for 
admissions; that the use of such separate standards resulted in the 
admission of minority applicants less qualified than plaintiff and other 
non-minority applicants who were therefore rejected. 
V. 
That by reason of the action of defendants in excluding plaintiff 
from the first-year Medical School class under defendants’ minority 
preference admission program plaintiff has been invidiously 
discriminated against on account of his race in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the California 
Constitution (Art. 1, sec. 21), and the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 
U.S.C. sec. 200(d)). 
VI. 
That plaintiff has no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Plaintiff alleges for a second cause of action: 
I. 
Plaintiff realleges and incorporates therein by reference each and 
every allegation contained in Paragraphs I through VI of his first 
cause of action set forth above. 
II. 
That plaintiff will suffer substantial and irreparable harm by reason 
of the continued refusal of defendants to admit him to said Medical 
School. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Plaintiff alleges for a third cause of action: 
I. 
Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference each and 
every allegation contained in Paragraphs I through VI of his first 
cause of action set forth above. 
II. 
That a bonafide and genuine dispute exists between Plaintiff, on 
the one hand, and, defendants, on the other hand, as to plaintiff’s right 
to be admitted to said Medical School. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays: 
1. That this Court issue its alternate writof mandate directing 
defendants to admit plaintiff to said Medical School, or to appear 
before the above entitled Court and show cause why said 
admission to said Medical School may be denied plaintiff. 
2. That the above entitled Court issue its order directing 
defendants to appear and show cause why they should not be 
enjoined during the pendency of this action and permanently from 
denying plaintiff admission to said Medical School. 
3. That this Court enter its judgment declaring that plaintiff is 
entitled to admission to said Medical School; and, further 
declaring, that defendants are lawfully obligated to admit plaintiff 
to said Medical School. 
4. For such other and further relief as to this Court may seem 
proper. 
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APPENDIX B 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 
ANN B. HOPKINS ) 
2134 Cathedral Avenue, N.W. ) Civil Action No. 
Washington, D. C. 20008 ) 
 ) COMPLAINT FOR 
v.  ) RELIEF FROM 
 ) VIOLATIONS OF 
PRICE WATERHOUSE ) CIVIL RIGHTS 
1801 K Street, N.M. )  
Washington, D.C. 20006 )  
    
 
1. This is an action for relief from violations of rights secured by Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et 
seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code 1-
2501 et seq. This Court has jurisdiction over the Title VII claims 
under 42 U.S.C. 2000e- 5(f)(3) and has pendent jurisdiction over the 
District of Columbia claims. 
 
2. Plaintiff Ann B. Hopkins is a female citizen of the United States 
and a resident of the District of Columbia. 
 
3. Defendant Price Waterhouse is a partnership that operates 
nationwide, specializing in providing management and accounting 
services to private corporations and governmental agencies on a 
contract basis. Defendant engages in business and maintains offices 
within the District of Columbia. Defendant is an employer within the 
meaning of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-(b) and D.C. Code 1-2502(10). 
 
4. In August 1978, defendant hired plaintiff as a manager in 
Washington, D.C. in the Office of Government Services within 
defendant’s Department of Management Advisory Services. This 
office’s mission is to secure and manage contracts with Federal 
agencies. At the time of her hire, plaintiff had extensive experience in 
the areas of management consulting, systems analysis and 
management. 
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5. After being employed by defendant, plaintiff was responsible for 
securing millions of dollars worth of new business for the firm. For 
example, plaintiff’s work on her initial assignment resulted in the 
award of two contracts of approximately $200,000 each from the 
Department of Interior, one of which she later managed. Plaintiff next 
turned to the Department of State, where she was responsible for 
developing a proposal that led to the award of a $1.2 million contract 
to compete with another firm in designing State’s financial 
management system. Plaintiff then successfully managed defendant’s 
entry in this competition, and the result was a $17 million contract 
with State to implement a financial management system worldwide. 
The partner-in-charge of plaintiff’s office has estimated the long-term 
value of this contract at $35 million. 
 
6. Following the events outlined in Paragraph 5, plaintiff was 
responsible for developing the proposals that led to two other awards: 
a $6 million contract with the Department of State to implement a 
worldwide real property management system, and a $2.5 million 
contract with the Department of Agriculture to design an automated 
accounting system for recording and tracking loans to farmers. When 
the latter contract was awarded, the partner-in-charge of plaintiff’s 
office wrote on December 2, 1982 to the head of defendant in New 
York that “Ann Hopkins has done it again!” 
 
7. In 1982 plaintiff was assigned responsibility for managing the real 
property management system project that she had developed for the 
Department of State. In addition, she was assigned responsibility for 
managing the Word Processing Department within her office. Both 
assignments were at a level of responsibility customarily given to 
partners, although plaintiff remained a senior manager. Plaintiff 
handled both assignments in a fully satisfactory manner. 
 
8. Defendant is a large firm with over 600 partners nationwide, 
including more than 30 in Washington, D.C. The firm also employs 
other professionals, such as plaintiff, as well as paraprofessional and 
clerical employees. As of July 1, 1983, five of defendant’s partners 
were women, and there were no female partners in Washington, D. C. 
Of the approximately 100 partners in plaintiff’s department nationally 
(Management Advisory Services), only one was a woman. 
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9. In the autumn of 1982, plaintiff was fully qualified for 
partnership with defendant, as is evident from evaluations that she 
received at that time from the partner-in-charge of her office and from 
another partner in her office: “terribly hard worker . . . always a 
perfect product . . . she’s unbelievable . . . [the State Department] 
could not be happier with her, and this is a tough, very demanding 
client . . . Ann has to be one of the very best . . . has to be better than 
many partners . . . there can’t be many of equal capability . . . 
intelligent . . . creative . . . hard working . . . decisive . . . self 
confident . . . a leader . . . Ann’s performance has been outstanding; 
she is bright, imaginative and assertive and is an asset to the firm.” 
These evaluations state without reservation that plaintiff should be 
promoted to partner as of July 1, 1983. For example, the partner-in-
charge declared simply that “she’s ready!” 
 
10. Candidates for partnership with defendant are nominated by their 
local offices and are then selected following consultation within the 
firm. In the autumn of 1982, plaintiff’s office nominated her for 
partnership. In late March 1983, however, she was notified that she 
had not been selected. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was told that she 
would have the opportunity to be considered for partnership again in 
the selection cycle beginning in the autumn of 1983. 
 
11. From March 1983 onward, plaintiff continued to perform in a 
fully satisfactory manner and continued to be fully qualified for 
partnership. For example, in September 1983 a State Department 
official wrote defendant a laudatory letter concerning the real property 
management project, for which plaintiff was responsible. The letter 
concluded that the “project is producing a high quality management 
tool which will meet the Department’s needs. I am very pleased with 
the performance of all members of the project team.” 
 
12. Despite the continuing high quality of her performance, plaintiff 
was notified in August 1983 that her office would not be nominating 
her for partnership during the selection cycle beginning in the autumn 
of 1983. At that time, she was told that it was unlikely that she would 
ever become a partner and that she should seriously consider leaving 
the firm. 
 
13. There is no legitimate basis for defendant’s refusal to admit 
plaintiff into membership with the firm by promoting her to partner, 
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and defendant has excluded plaintiff from membership because of her 
sex.  Plaintiff is as qualified, or more qualified, for promotion to 
partner than men who have been promoted to partner in the recent 
past, both in Washington, D.C. and nationwide.  For example, of the 
three men (and no women) who became partners in plaintiff’s office 
in 1983, one had worked for defendant for less time than she had, 
while another had served as her subordinate.  Defendant has never 
criticized plaintiff’s performance; on the contrary, her evaluations 
have consistently been enthusiastic.  The only suggestion made by 
defendant to plaintiff was that she “soften” her image.  In this regard, 
it was suggested that she wear make-up and style her hair. 
 
14. On August 30, 1983, plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that defendant had 
excluded her from membership in the firm because of her sex.  As a 
result of filing her charge, plaintiff was subjected to retaliation and 
harassment, including intensive and unwarranted project reviews; 
efforts to elicit information from plaintiff’s subordinates that would 
discredit her; and the assignment of her office to another employee. 
 
15. As a result of defendant’s actions described herein, plaintiff was 
subjected to constructive discharge by defendant effective January 17, 
1984.  On February 8, 1984, plaintiff filed a second charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that she had 
been subjected to retaliation and constructive discharge for filing the 
first charge.  Defendant has continued to retaliate against plaintiff 
following her constructive discharge. 
 
16. At the time plaintiff was hired by defendant, defendant 
contracted to consider her for partnership on the basis of her 
performance, and this contractual assurance induced plaintiff to 
accept employment with defendant.  In addition, defendant routinely 
considers employees in plaintiff’s position for partnership after they 
have served a period of “aprenticeship,” and defendant explicitly uses 
the prospect of future partnership to induce new employees to join the 
firm.  Consideration for partnership was a term, condition or privilege 
of plaintiff’s employment with defendant. 
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COUNT ONE 
TITLE VII 
17. Paragraphs 1-16 herein are realleged. 
 
18. All prerequisites to suit under Title VII have been satisfied. 
 
19. The acts of defendant in excluding plaintiff from partnership 
because of her sex, and in harassing her and subjecting her to 
constructive discharge, constitute violations of Title VII. Unless 
restrained by order of this Court, defendant will continue to pursue 
such unlawful practices. 
 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff asks that this Court: 
 
1) enjoin defendant from discriminating in partnership decisions on 
the basis of sex; 
 
2) enjoin defendant from retaliation against individuals who have 
engaged in activities protected by Title VII; 
 
3) require defendant to accord plaintiff partnership compensation and 
all accrued benefits; 
 
4) award such other relief as the interests of justice may require, 
including payment of plaintiff’s costs and disbursements herein 
and her reasonable attorneys’ fees. 
 
COUNT TWO 
D.C. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 
20. Paragraphs 1-16 herein are realleged. 
 
21. All prerequisites to suit under the District of Columbia Human 
Rights Act have been satisfied. 
 
22. The acts of defendant in excluding plaintiff from partnership 
because of her sex, and in harassing her and subjecting her to 
constructive discharge, constitute intentional, willful, wanton, 
reckless and malicious violations of the District of Columbia Human 
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Rights Act. Unless restrained by order of this Court, defendant will 
continue to pursue such unlawful practices. 
 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff asks that the Court: 
 
1) enjoin defendant from discriminating in partnership  decisions 
on the basis of sex; 
 
2) enjoin defendant from retaliating against individuals who have 
engaged in activities protected by the Human Rights Act; 
 
3) require defendant to accord plaintiff partnership status 
effective July 1, 1983, with full retroactive compensation and 
all accrued benefits; 
 
4) award plaintiff $250,000 in compensatory damages for inter 
alia pain, suffering, humiliation and emotional distress caused 
by defendant’s unlawful actions; 
 
5) award plaintiff $1,000,000 in punitive damages; 
 
6) award such other relief as the interests of justice may require, 
including payment of plaintiff’s costs and disbursements 
herein and her reasonable attorneys’ fees. 
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JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff requests trial by jury as to all issues in Count Two of this 
Complaint. 
  Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
 
Douglas B. Huron 
 
 
 
  KATOR, SCOTT & HELLER 
  1029 Vermont Avenue, N.W. Suite 900 
  Washington, D.C. 20005 
  202-393-3800 
   
  Attorneys for Plaintiff 
 
